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China‟s Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power 
 
 
Abstract 
China has (re)emerged as a great power in a world not of its own making. The 
distribution of power in major organisations and the dominant norms of international 
interactions are deemed to unfairly favour the existing Western powers, and at times 
obstruct China‟s ability to meet national development goals. Nevertheless, engaging 
the global economy has been a key source of economic growth (thus helping to 
maintain regime stability), and establishing China‟s credentials as a responsible global 
actor is seen as a means of ensuring continued access to what China needs. As an 
emerging great power that is also still in many respects a developing country, China‟s 
challenge is to change the global order in ways that do not cause global instability or 
generate crises that would damage China‟s own ability to generate economic growth 
and ensure political stability. 
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Chinese understandings of China‟s place in the world can be summed up by the 
content of two separate news items from the same day. The first pointed to China‟s 
global economic reach and significance. It was simply no longer possible for the 
existing powers to ignore such an important economic force and China had to be a 
central component of any new mechanisms of global governance, Chinese interests 
2 
 
and ideas taken more seriously, and the existing power structures revised to take 
account of China‟s economic power.  
 
The second focussed on China‟s position on global environmental issues. Although a 
big power, China, it argued, was still very much a developing country with more than 
100 million people living in poverty and hundreds of millions more lacking the basic 
standards of living that are taken for granted in the West. It would simply not be fair 
for the Chinese to be denied the same benefits of development that people in the 
developed expected – particularly given that the developed world was responsible for 
the overwhelming majority of carbon dioxide emissions since Europe began to 
develop two centuries ago. 
 
So we have, in the eyes of many Chinese, a China that deserves to be at the centre of 
global politics. And promoting the idea of returning to the “great power” status that 
China held for centuries before subjugation by militarily superior western powers in 
the nineteenth century has a strong resonance within China. There is also a widely 
held and strong popular sense of injustice that China is being unfairly “demonised” by 
its enemies (Song et al 1996; Liu and, Liu 1997; Song et al 2009). China is a great 
power in a world that is not of its own making, where existing power structures have 
been established by others to serve the interests of the developed West. A dissatisfied 
great power with myriad domestic developmental challenges that remain the primary 
focus of China‟s leaders – challenges that might even undermine continued rule by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) if not correctly handled.  
 
But dissatisfaction and a desire for change has not (yet) resulted in a revolutionary 
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global agenda. On the contrary, China‟s leaders are keen to project an image of 
responsibility and trustworthiness; a responsible great power that is a force for global 
peace, stability and growth. This is not simply a desire to be liked. China‟s leaders 
understand that the world is watching them closely - and that many of those watching 
are concerned. In particular, by the late 1990s there was an increasing recognition by 
China‟s leaders that their rejectionist and critical language and rhetoric of Chinese 
foreign policy was raising concerns in other states about China‟s ultimate objectives 
(Johnston 2003). Should this concern result in policies designed to contain China and 
constrain its development, then the task of meeting domestic challenges would 
become ever harder (Shirk 2007). Thus, external perceptions of what China wants are 
partly driven by what China says and does - and what China does and says is partly a 
response to these external perceptions.  
 
For the promoters and supporters of the global liberal order, the rise of China seems to 
have been identified as the single biggest challenge – more so even than global 
economic chaos. So before outlining in more detail the understanding of a 
“dissatisfied responsible great power”, and what exactly China wants to change, this 
article first establishes why it is that China seems to be such a source of concern. The 
answer is partly found in the simple speed and scale of change in China in the post-
cold war era; change that has had unintentional consequences for the rest of the world. 
But it is also goes beyond just the practical and real impact of China‟s rise into a more 
deep seated mistrust of China‟s long term objectives, and the values and belief 
systems than underpin these aspirations. In short, no matter what China‟s leaders 
might say, some in the west remain convinced that China aims to shift not just the 
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global balance of power but also the way in which international interactions occur and 
are governed as soon as it is in a position to do so.  
 
Interpreting China’s Rise: China as Threat 
Perhaps there is something intrinsically destabilising (and worrying) about dramatic 
changes in the global order no matter what (or who) is causing this change. But there 
is more to concern over China‟s rise than just the trauma of change. On one level, we 
have already seen changes in the price and distribution of major commodities, and 
massive shifts in global financial flows. On another level, as with Japan‟s rise in the 
1970s, there is a feeling that China is succeeding by not “playing by the rules” – or 
more correctly, by using the rules of the global capitalist system when they suit China 
but bending and sometimes ignoring those rules that are deemed to be damaging to 
the national interest.  
 
China‟s ultimate objectives are also questioned. Even though China‟s transformation 
owes much to its integration into the existing global economic order, the concern 
remains that once it has the power to do so, China
1
 will try to change both the 
structure of international institutions and also norms of governance (both domestic 
and global). Indeed, relations with “rogue states” like Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe 
are seen as evidence that a China challenge to the global liberal order is already 
underway. In some (extreme) interpretations, conflict between a rising China and the 
USA is all but inevitable (Bernstein and Munro 1998). 
 
                                                 
1
  Of course, “China” doesn‟t act or have a single interest, and “China” is used here simply as short-
hand for the actions, aspirations and perceptions of the political elites.  
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For those who fear China, it represents a combination of two previous challenges to 
the Western world order. In the eyes of a (racist) Europe at the end of the nineteenth 
century, China and Japan were considered to be the “yellow peril”, threatening to 
swamp the world with cheap labour and uncivilised ways. And this was before 
Japan‟s military power and aggression became a serious Asian challenge to European 
hegemony. After the Korean War (1950-53), Japan became a new Asian (yellow) 
challenge; like China today, a rising Asian power trying to compete and perhaps beat 
the West by playing in the global economy, but not playing wholly by the rules. At 
the same time, while no longer driven by communist ideology, China remains ruled 
by a Communist Party; with communism historically seen as posing a (red) challenge 
to the West. So if China is a combination of the red peril of communism and the 
yellow peril of Asia it becomes a new, “orange peril” for the 21st century; at least for 
those who see mystery, opacity and hidden intentions in what emerges from the East. 
 
For the suspicious, the roots of China‟s long term strategy are found in Deng 
Xiaoping‟s foreign policy prescriptions. Fearing condemnation and possible isolation 
after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Deng exhorted his comrades to “hide 
brightness and foster obscurity”; most often taken to mean that China should hide its 
true abilities and ambitions. While China today may have abandoned obscurity for 
Great Power politics, the suspicion that real intentions remain hidden and that China 
cannot be trusted remains at the heart of many observations today (Geis and Holt 
2009).  
 
Even without this mistrust, the speed and scale of China‟s rise alone would probably 
have been enough to raise concern in the rest of the world. As Communist Party rule 
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unravelled in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s, 
China‟s leaders were facing severe challenges of their own; the social/political fallout 
of Tiananmen, elite conflict over the wisdom of further economic reform and strained 
relations with many western countries did not suggest a rosy future. 
 
Yet, in many respects it was the responses to this position of apparent weakness that 
generated China‟s subsequent dramatic rise. Deng Xiaoping‟s support for further 
economic liberalisation and integration with the global economy during an official 
tour of southern China in 1992 has come to be regarded as a symbolic “turning point” 
(Wong and Zheng 2001). In less than two decades, China has become the world‟s 
third biggest economy (the second biggest using Purchasing Power Parity 
calculations), the world‟s largest exporter, and the single biggest holder of foreign 
currency reserves. China has the three biggest banks in the world (measured by 
market capitalisation) (Wines and Wong 2009) and become a major investor in 
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Chinese investment in Europe, Australia 
and North America have also become significant – indeed, in the wake of the global 
economic crisis China has emerged not only as a potential major source of much 
needed investment, but also through the development of its own domestic demand, as 
a potential alternative to declining Western consumption. China has become a 
“stabilizer” of the global economy (People‟s Daily 2010). 
 
In thinking through the implications of this dramatic change for the global order, a 
number of theorists have looked to the past for their inspiration and evidence and the 
“historical correlation between extraordinary rapid internal growth and external 
expansion” (Friedberg 1993-4: 16). Rising powers are by their nature a challenge to 
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the global order, and even more of a challenge when they are dissatisfied with the 
existing order, or feel oppressed and constrained by it – as was the case with Japan 
and Germany in the 1920s and 30s (see Johnston 2003). 
 
 It becomes the responsibility of the existing power (in this case the US) to manage 
this rise in ways that do not lead to conflict (Schweller 1999). Such  “power 
transition” approaches suggest that once China has the economic and/or military 
strength to do so, it will first demand a greater role in the international order 
commensurate to its power, and subsequently challenge the existing hegemonic power 
(see Goldstein 2005). For Mearsheimer (2001), this suggests that the US should be 
doing whatever it takes to prevent China rising to challenge its supremacy before it‟s 
too late.
 
It is not just coincidence that much of the literature on China‟s rise has been 
written by scholars in the USA intended to influence a domestic audience. In this 
respect, they are in some ways more to do with the decline of the existing hegemon 
than the rise of a new one (see Dumbrell, this volume). 
 
Interpreting China’s Rise: Global Challenger or Rule Taker? 
Despite these fears, the evidence of scholarship for over a decade suggests that in the 
United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Trade Organisation, 
China has been much more a rule taker than a challenger to the existing international 
order (Kim 1999, Jacobsen and Oksenberg 1999, Wei, 2007). Indeed, Johnston (2008) 
shows how participation in the global disarmament regime has resulted in changes to 
not just Chinese discourse and action, but also to Chinese bureaucratic structures to 
make them “fit” with the existing global institutions.  
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In terms of China‟s economic paradigm, the evidence is more mixed. Major concerns 
remain over China‟s use of exchange rate controls, support for exporters, continued 
protection of key domestic sectors and the rather opaque nature of decision making 
(and the dissemination of information). Yet much of China‟s remarkable economic 
growth has been achieved by adjusting the domestic order to facilitate integration with 
the capitalist global economy. As Hu Xijin (2008: 27) argues, China is doing well 
precisely because it is “playing by the rules that Westerners themselves have 
formulated”. And of course, trying to rig the rules of the game to create an uneven 
playing field is not exactly a practice that is unique to China.  
 
China has also become an advocate of liberal economic norms of a sort through its 
active promotion of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area providing access to its 
domestic agricultural market that China (Chia 2008) argues China‟s „competitors‟ 
find it difficult to countenance.  And perhaps it is in China‟s own back yard that we 
see the biggest movements towards status quo activity and discourses. In the early 
1990s, ASEAN as an organisation and many of the states of Southeast Asia were 
viewed with suspicion if not open hostility in Beijing. But both perceptions and 
policies changed as China‟s leaders moved to block the regional ambitions of others 
(Taiwan, Japan and the US), and began to see China‟s economic and (non-traditional) 
security interests as inextricably bound with what happens in the rest of the region 
(Breslin 2009).  
 
Chinese Perceptions of China’s Global Role 
Proactive engagement of the region is also part of a broader strategy designed to 
assuage fears about the consequences of China‟s rise. It is also driven by more 
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pragmatic understandings that perceptions matter. For example, the promotion of the 
idea of a “China Threat” in the West could be used to justify policies designed to 
obstruct China‟s further rise (Liu 2002).   
 
The task of changing these perceptions is largely an elite-driven project, but one not 
confined to leaders and officials. Many Chinese scholars share leaders‟ concerns over 
images and perceptions and are involved in attempts to explain to both domestic and 
international audiences how and why China‟s rise will be a peaceful one. Some of 
these scholars work in official research organisations and can be seen as part of the 
wider state effort. For example, the concept of China‟s “Peaceful Rise” was 
developed by Zheng Bijian (2005) – a political advisor and scholar who is widely 
understood to have developed the idea at the behest of China‟s top leaders and to 
propagate it through non- and semi-official fora. Other university-based scholars have 
less formal connections to the formal party-state apparatus but can be considered to 
form part of a wider project of what Beijing University academic Pan Wei (2010: 9) 
calls “a movement of cultural renaissance.” 
 
The overarching objective is to show by word and deed that a rising China is a force 
for global stability, peace and prosperity. The basic argument propounded by this 
combination of leaders, scholars and officials is that China is a “responsible great 
power”. In contrast to the predatory colonial European powers of the nineteenth 
century, China‟s state identity and actions were driven by different philosophies and 
cultures that stressed the need for harmony, respect, dialogue and consultation. And in 
contrast to the dissatisfied rising powers of the 20
th
 century, China‟s rise would be a 
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peaceful one; it was China and Chinese values, not the existing order that would help 
to build a “Harmonious World” (Su 2009).  
 
China‟s Promotion of a Chinese Alternative? 
In short, China wants to be accepted as a key global actor that is a force for peace and 
stability, but also a force for peaceful change. For example, Chinese participation in 
the G20 is seen as a welcome and marked improvement on an at best marginal 
position in the G8,
 2
 reflecting China‟s increased power and status. But participation 
in Gs of any size is a means to the more important end of “democratising” global 
governance; for example, by reforming the distribution of power in the international 
financial institutions, with a greater say for developing countries towards ultimately 
parity with the developed world.
3
  China also supports UN reform, including greater 
representation for developing countries on the Security Council – but whether this 
equates to diluting its own veto power is another question altogether.  
 
But there is more to this “democratic” global order than just votes and institutions. 
There is a clear attempt to construct an idea of China as “different” – not just different 
from previous rising powers but a different kind of actor that other contemporary 
powers, seeking the creation of a different (but peaceful) world order.   
 
According to this view, it is not China that is the source of tension and conflict, but 
the existing world order. An order in which the developing world is politically 
                                                 
2
  While not a member of the G8, Chinese officials participated in many outreach activities including 
meetings of finance ministers prior to the global crisis. China‟s leaders have attended G8 related 
dialogue activities since the 2003 summit in Evian, though Hu Jintao left the 2009 summit in Pisa 
before its commencement to deal with disturbances in Xinjiang. 
3
  For a typical example of Chinese views, see “China Demands Larger Quota Share of Developing 
Countries in IMF”, People‟s Daily Online, 5th October 2009. 
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marginalised and economically subject to the will of the developed. If necessary, the 
powerful are prepared to use military force against those who are not considered to be 
part of the self defined “international community”. So the promotion of an idea of 
what China is – what it believes in, what it aspires to and how it acts – can be thought 
of as a process of “Occidentalism;” a China that is defined in opposition to the 
negative values and objectives of the West. 
 
So rather than impose supposedly universal (but really Western) values on other 
countries, China thinks each sovereign state should develop its own systems of 
authority based on their own peculiar histories, cultures and experiences. Unlike the 
West, China engages others from a spirit of mutual gain – a win-win scenario –with 
no liberalising strings attached to business relations, treating developing states as 
equal partners.  
 
There is also an increasing emphasis on the idea of China as a “model” that other 
developing states might learn from. In reality, identifying core components of this 
model is extremely difficult. A strong role for the state seems to be a recurring theme. 
Domestically, despite introducing a private sector, and allowing foreign actors to play 
a key role in promoting growth, the state still plays a key role as “anchors of 
economic stability” through macroeconomic intervention, ownership of the major 
banks, and residual state ownership of enterprises in key industries (Wang 2009). 
Internationally, globalisation is portrayed as having been “managed” so as to bring 
benefits but not vulnerabilities. But perhaps the single defining component of the 
Chinese “model”  is experimentation and a non ideological (perhaps even de-
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ideologised) commitment to doing whatever it takes to promote growth whilst 
maintaining political stability (Heilmann 2009).
 
 
 
Again, it is not so much what China is and what China stands for that is important as 
what it is not – it is not the Western agenda (or what is presented as the Western 
agenda). China stands against “shock therapy” rapid transitions to the market, against 
wholesale liberalisation (particularly of finance), against the necessary linkage 
between economic and political liberalisation/democratisation, and against the idea 
that there is or should be a single model. So China‟s economic rise becomes an 
example of not doing things the western way, and instead doing what works best 
given the unique set of conditions that all countries face. And of course, this has all 
occurred under “regime continuity” (Sun 2008).  
 
A subtle but important component of this promotion of alternative is the attempt to 
develop what we might call “definitional power”. Rather than simply denying the 
relevance of key concepts and ideas developed in the West, there is now an attempt to 
re-interpret or re-define them to suit Chinese interests. For example, Chinese scholars 
and officials are defining what democracy and human rights mean in the Chinese 
context in means that don‟t contradict or undermine continued one party rule (Yu 
2003. State Council 2005). The terms of political debates are not being left to others 
to set, but instead are being defined in China on China‟s terms.  
 
Whether the roots of China‟s contemporary international interactions really lie in 
China‟s traditional system and political thought is open to question. Indeed, there 
seems to be an attempt to create a history to look back to using an eclectic mix of a 
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variety of (sometimes conflicting) Chinese thinkers and philosophies (Ding 2008). 
We might also question the extent to which China has always been a force for peace 
and harmony. And there seems to be a tendency in some quarters to explain Chinese 
growing influence as a result of a growing attraction to Chinese values at the expense 
of a focus on harder commercial relationships – nothing increases the attraction of a 
state identity more than a large cheque! Nevertheless, as Olimat (2010: 185) argues, 
places like the Middle East are generally open to Chinese initiatives as: 
China presents itself in the region in a much more positive posture 
than the US. The latter is seen as anti-Arab, anti-Islam, and anti-
Palestinian, hegemonic, dominant, coercive and exploitive to the 
region. 
 
From Soft Power to Hard Realities 
Nevertheless, the suggestion here is that rather than focus on “soft” ideational 
considerations, three “harder” material considerations are more likely to be key 
determinants of China‟s global role and impact in the future. First, resource 
requirements have been the main driver of Chinese outward investment, and finding 
the wherewithal to maintain domestic growth will continue to drive Chinese relations 
with large parts of the world. In addition to the current emphasis on raw materials and 
industrial supplies, China‟s search for food resources and security are likely to 
become ever more important over time. Notably, this has led to close relations with a 
number of states that have strained relations with the west – for example, China has 
become Iran‟s largest trade partner and Iran provides around a tenth of China‟s crude 
oil imports. 
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Second, while there is some concern that China might one day have the military might 
to threaten the US (and of course, much more clear and direct concern in Taiwan), the 
more pressing issue is Chinese arms sales and technology transfer to others. Although 
China has promised to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime, it has not 
formally joined it, and stands accused of exporting technology to, among others, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan and Syria (Rasmussen 2007) and to contributing 
(thorough arms ales) to armed conflict and/or state repression in Burma, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda  
(Amnesty International 2006).  
 
The argument here is not so much that China is changing the balance of power 
directly, but indirectly through its relations with other countries – including so called 
“rogue states” – it is making it harder for the liberal west to pursue its global 
objectives. This “blocking” power is reinforced by China‟s permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, which it acquired when Beijing assumed the China seat in 1971.  
China has used its veto to block the introduction of sanctions against Zimbabwe and 
to prevent official UN censure of human rights abuses in Myanmar. The difference 
today is that China can offer more than just diplomatic support to those that it wants 
to defend. 
 
But while the first two considerations suggest increasing ties between China and other 
developing states, the third raises a counter word of caution. It is easy to fall into a 
simply black and white dichotomy of the developed liberal west fearing China and the 
underdeveloped world welcoming and supporting the new emerging global power; but 
that is far too simplistic. There are many in the developing world who are worried 
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about China‟s rise. Cheap Chinese imports and an influx of Chinese traders have 
caused considerable problems for domestic producers and retailers in parts of Latin 
America and Africa, forcing many out of business. There are also complaints that 
Chinese companies that win contracts in Africa undercut domestic firms and do not 
even use local employees for skilled work (Onyango 2009), while local workers in 
some Chinese-owned factories and mines have resorted to violent protests to demand 
better treatment and conditions. In short, we might expect that the more Chinese 
power is projected in actual commercial relations on the ground, the more that it will 
come under scrutiny and the more it will generate concerns within the supposedly 
supportive developing world. 
 
Conclusions 
For many who are interested in the impact of China for the world, there is often an 
apparent implicit assumption that China‟s growth will continue and that a continued 
rise is inevitable. This is not a view shared by those who study China from the inside 
out – nor by China‟s leaders who are concerned that continued inequality and 
corruption might result in large sections of the population becoming alienated from 
the party. And although government intervention meant that China got through the 
worst of the global economic crisis in 2009, this could be at the expense of increasing 
bank debts and other structural problems in the long run. The “model” of growth 
generated more by investment and exports is frequently though by many to have run 
its course (Yao 2010) 
 
We also have to take care and not overstate the importance of China (or the decline of 
the West). In military terms, although the official Chinese figures might understate the 
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true extent of financing, the US spends more on the military than the next 45 countries 
in combination. Chinese investment in Africa and Latin America have indeed risen 
quickly, but Europe, the US and Japan remain key partners as well. If China had the 
financial power that some suggest it already has, then the US would not have sold 
arms to Taiwan in January 2010, and President Obama would not have met the Dalai 
Lama the following month. China might be in a much stronger position to defend 
itself than at any other time for at least a couple of centuries, but this does not yet 
mean that China can force others to simply fall in line with Beijing‟s interests. 
Furthermore, its also not clear how China plans to operationalise its desire to 
introduce a more democratic global order; for example, to change the structure of the 
Bretton Woods institutions. It also remains to be seen whether China‟s image in the 
developing world will be reassessed as Chinese actors expand their actual contacts 
with developing countries and whether the Chinese self-image of being a very 
different type of international actor can be sustained. An assertive and confident 
China is also likely to increasingly alarm others – no matter how much time and effort 
China‟s leaders expend on trying to convince skeptics about their country‟s benign 
intent and penchant for peace and harmony. 
 
The idea that China can change the world at will and with ease is overstated and 
exaggerated But while the decline of the West in Africa and elsewhere might be 
overstated, China‟s relationship with developing countries has provided clear 
alternatives to the western global order. It also seems clear that domestic economic 
considerations – most notably resource requirements – will shape not just China‟s 
international interactions, but the policy of other states towards China‟s key partners. 
What is more clear, is that how the Chinese government decides to articulate a 
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national interest is a crucial component in any change in the global order; quite simply, 
if a change is not palatable to Beijing, then it is not likely to occur. Perhaps China 
does not yet have the power to dictate changes in the global order, but it does have the 
power to block them and ensure that its interests are taken into account. In the long 
term, it seems likely that China will increasingly push to change rules and norms, but 
in ways that do not cause instability or generate global crises; crises that would 
damage China‟s own ability to generate economic growth and ensure political 
stability. Finding way of peacefully promoting change is not just a matter of assuming 
global responsibility, but a matter of pragmatic national self interest as well.  
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